Dear NFPA,

I’m a long time journalist who’s covered this fire since it happened, including doing extensive interviews with 11 people inside the club. My article with radio reports, victim interviews, and photos is at http://hammernews.com/nightclub.htm , which you’re welcome to study for any useful information.

Your apparent interests in reducing the capacity for requiring sprinklers are good and valid, but like in auto repair, one should always start with the simpleist and easiest fix.

In this and future fire prevention rules I would recommend:

1.) Doubling the numbers of fire extinguishers in public places, which must be prominently located, brightly colored (upscale establishments will try to blend them in till invisible), and high enough to be widely visible.

2.) Require extinguishers on either side of any public stage area, which have acts that use many power and audio cables that can spark or short and costumes, curtains, and decorations that can ignite. There was 10-15 seconds in which this Station fire could have been extinguished easily, with no loss of life. The gases in the smoke may have made some people sick, and some might have been trampled, but this was the initial outrageous failing.

3.) Require subsidiary exit signs in main room with an arrow directing towards actual exit. The exit in the back left corridor was totally unknown to any patron at The Station, the one in the lounge not really visible (I think) from the floor. Require duplicate exit signs on the floor visible when the room fills with smoke. Require exit doors to be brightly colored differently than the wall- the lounge door blended in (as did a door in the 1977 Ky fire).

4.) There is evidence bouncers turned people away from the stage exit (who died) and shoved people trying to exit the front door. No instructions were screamed to direct people towards the other 2 open exits. Bouncers are often large part-time people who are in it for the power. Mandate some free fire training for all club bouncers, which may be simply impressing them with the need to know all fire exits and their legal responsibility to direct people out them, not reserving an exit for the band or themselves. 2 or 3 dozen people should have been able to escape out that stage exit, which would have relieved some of the pressure on the front door- allowing more to escape there. This might have prevented 1/3-1/2 of the fatalities.

5.) Mandate minimum continuous width requirements for main entrances. Narrowing patrons to a single file by immovable obstructions to ensure payment (which may have been done) should be banned.

6.) Ban non-flame retardant foam and ceiling panels from any public place. This stuff is both a spectacular accelerant and producer of poison gas and blinding smoke.